United Kingdom 2024

Regressive

2024

Uncommitted

Engaged

Emerging Leader

Leader

Uncommitted

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Country summary

The United Kingdom’s approach to civilian harm mitigation and response contains important examples of good practice in its policies and select recent military campaigns. An assessment as to the extent to which these good practices are embedded within institutional policy, training, and decision-making is challenged by an overall lack of transparency around the UK’s approach. Where elements of the approach can be reviewed publicly, there are also some evident gaps. The UK does not, for instance, appear to consistently track or investigate allegations of civilian harm according to the same standard as its allies and independent monitors. In the past, the UK has had systems in place to offer voluntary compensation payments to civilians harmed by military operations, particularly during earlier conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In recent operations, these mechanisms have been removed and legislation has been introduced to limit options for civilians to seek compensation, meaning there is now no effective reparations mechanism in the UK. Overall, the UK’s approach to protecting civilians during military operations could benefit from greater clarity, coordination, and transparency. Creating CHMR-focused policies that build on existing human security policy, combined with improvements in tracking harm, investigating incidents, and providing post-harm responses are necessary to strengthen the UK’s civilian protection efforts going forward.

1. National policy

The national policy or system of policies, strategies, and guidance adopted by the executive branch of government and its organs (including security institutions) that establishes clear authorities, responsibilities, and guidance for the prevention, mitigation, and response to civilian harm. A national policy framework, when combined with effective implementation of its provisions and formalised engagement with civil society actors can be helpful for communicating a government's commitment to mitigate harm to civilians.

The UK has a policy framework aimed at mitigating civilian harm, notably through the Joint Services Publication 985 (2024) and the UK Approach to Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2020). These documents contain elements of good practice, for instance by placing the direct impact of war on civilians in the wider context of human security, reflecting the indirect and reverberating consequences of warfare. At the same time, steps can be taken to significantly improve the policy framework in key areas. Notably, while the policy framework highlights the UK’s commitment to mitigating harm caused by others, it offers little in addressing civilian harm from UK operations. These shortcomings hinder the practical implementation of civilian harm mitigation efforts.

Recommendations

• Conduct a review of the UK’s approach to tracking, investigating, assessing, reporting, and responding to civilian harm from UK actions

• Increase the transparency of the UK’s approach to civilian harm mitigation and response

• Provide definitions of key terminology

• Clarify roles and responsibilities for executing the JSP985, including resourcing for capability development.

• Require periodic public reporting on the implementation of the JSP985 and the UK Approach to Protection of Civilians.

1.1 National policy framework

The government has adopted a comprehensive national policy framework on mitigating and responding to civilian harm resulting from its own military operations, including clear definitions of key terminology such as 'civilian harm'.

1.2 Clear policy language

The policy contains clear and actionable language and commitment to civilian harm mitigation and response.

1.3 Clear implementation guidance

Policy and implementation guidance is clear and includes defined roles and responsibilities.

1.4 Budget and resources

Funding, personnel and time are given toward implementation of CHMR policies.

2. Civilian harm tracking

An internal (military or security force) process by which an armed actor gathers and analyses data about civilian harm incidents in order to better prevent, mitigate, and address harm in the future.

While the UK has outlined the importance of civilian harm tracking in rhetoric, it does not appear to have a functional approach to doing so in practice. While allies and independent monitors have found significant evidence of harm from UK airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, the MoD maintains that it has evidence of only a single civilian casualty from this campaign, indicating either a lack of engagement with the available evidence or a threshold for admitting civilian harm that is far higher than those of its allies. In a 2023 tribunal, a Deputy Director of the MoD responsible admitted being unaware of a systematic approach to tracking harm allegations or a consistent UK written approach to investigating civilian harm.

Recommendations

• Build - or strengthen - an institutional approach to proactively track civilian harm

• Establish a reporting channel for external reports

• Use tracking mechanisms for operational learning

2.1 Tracking mechanism

The government has or plans for the capabilities, resources, personnel, and systems needed to track civilian harm, i.e., to systematically collect and analyse information on harm.

2.2 Tracking to reduce harm through analysis

The tracking mechanism is effectively designed to produce meaningful analysis and insights that are used by military leaders to change tactics or procedures. The express and stated purpose of the tracking mechanism in policy and practice is to prevent, mitigate, and address harm and promote institutional and operational learning.

2.3 Coordination with investigation mechanisms

Tracking mechanisms interact effectively with civilian harm investigations.

2.4 Data management

Tracking mechanisms have reliable access to accurate information and sufficiently detailed records about military operations (e.g., troop movements, airstrikes, incident reports). Incidents and analyses are properly archived and retrievable years later.

3. Investigations

Formal inquiries (often in the form of administrative or criminal investigations) that can be used to elucidate facts, to understand the cause of harm, to identify relevant state and/or individual responsibilities, to facilitate the appropriate response and/or remedy, and even to exonerate.

The UK has made commitments to investigate civilian harm allegations. However, this is undermined by a lack of transparency, consistency, and accountability on the UK’s methodology and findings. While policies such as those used during ISAF in Afghanistan showed an intent to investigate civilian harm, allegations have recently emerged of extensive harm to civilians at the hands of UK special forces in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to cover these up. Campaigns launched after ISAF have seen less clarity on how allegations of harm are investigated and assessed.

Recommendations

• Standardise and institutionalise the UK methodology to assess and investigate allegations of civilian harm.

• Use a sliding scale to determine the of credibility of reports

• Increase transparency and public reporting

• Improve interaction between investigations and response mechanisms

3.1 Investigates all credible reports

Promptly investigates all credible reports of civilian harm, whether or not it is immediately clear that a violation of international law has occurred. Obtains relevant information from all internal, and, to the extent feasible, all external sources.

3.2 Conducts witness interviews and site visits

Investigating officers conduct site visits and/or conduct witness interviews or provide reasons why doing so is infeasible. If this is infeasible, there is clarity on how evidentiary gaps will be addressed.

3.3 Reports of investigation

Reports of investigations include a description of the process followed, the evidence consulted and included (including witness statements), information about its factual and legal findings, and recommendations for preventing a recurrence of civilian harm.

3.4 Interaction with response mechanisms

Investigations connect meaningfully to response mechanisms. Civilians who report incidents are informed of the possible response they can expect from the state. Acknowledgements of harm following the conclusion of an investigation address the next steps in terms of amends.

3.5 Criminal investigations

Incidents of a suspected criminal nature are referred to an independent, impartial investigative authority for investigating criminal violations.

4. Public reporting & transparency

Systems and procedures to ensure that the public and institutions of public oversight are made sufficiently aware of civilian harm, and to protect the right of victims to pursue remedy. Information may be limited or redacted due to privacy concerns for affected civilians, to safeguard other ongoing investigations or for national security reasons, but these reasons should be subject to review.

During OIR, the UK was very transparent on the time and location of its airstrikes, setting a strong example for allies. However, this practice has not been institutionalised or carried forward to new operations, such as those countering the Houthis in Yemen. The UK never reported consistently on civilian harm allegations. The MoD often highlights the difficulties in gathering data on civilian harm in conflicts, yet has failed to engage with international and local NGOs offering data and evidence, it has not taken on best practices used by allies and independent watchdogs performing this task in the same conflict zones, and it has not laid out a strategy for how it will address such challenges.

Recommendations

• Institutionalise reporting on use of force

• Enhance transparency in civilian harm reporting

• Establish comprehensive civilian harm reporting

• Enhance oversight

4.1 Discloses time and location of operations

Makes public information, to include time and location, of operations including airstrikes, except in circumstances when doing so would place civilians or security personnel at risk.

4.2 Civilian harm reporting

Regularly issues and disseminates reports on civilian harm resulting from military operations that includes an estimate of casualties, the source of harm, the type of harm experienced, and the location of the incident(s) and any reasons for discrepancies with estimates or accounts from other sources such as NGOs or the media.

4.3 Public disclosure of process and records

Releases information about mitigation tactics, investigative processes and records to the public whenever possible. Shares criteria used for the 'credibility' assessment and investigation of harm allegations.

5. Post-harm response

Efforts to acknowledge and express condolence for harm, to include offers of monetary and non-monetary forms of post-harm assistance.

The UK currently has no national system for providing amends to those harmed by its military actions. During counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK government implemented a structured system for offering compensation for civilian harm and property damage. However, during OIR, there was a stark shift in policy, with no regular approach to ex-gratia payments to civilians. This appears to have been replicated in more recent operations, such as Operation Poseidon Archer in Yemen, which has led to allegations of civilian harm that the UK has not responded to. Additionally, legislative changes limiting compensation claims have further restricted civilians’ ability to seek redress, effectively curbing the UK’s willingness to acknowledge or compensate for harm altogether.

Recommendations

• Establish enduring institutional approach to responding to harm to civilians

• Take a comprehensive view of response

• Emphasise moral responsibility in amends policy

5.1 Process for amends

The government implements a functional, timely, and adequately resourced process to receive and process requests and proactively provides monetary and non-monetary amends for harm caused by operations.

5.2 Acknowledgement

The government publicly acknowledges responsibility for harm.

5.3 Comprehensive, victim-centred condolence

Policies governing the offer and provision of condolences should be broadly defined, culturally appropriate and sensitive to local needs as defined by those affected.

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Resources

Government

UK Government. “Armed Forces Act 2006.” 2006. [Link ]
Foreign Affairs Committee. “Annual Report on Human Rights 2006.” June 2007. [Link ]
NATO. “Night Raids Tactical Directive.” January 23, 2010. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence, J9 Policy Division, Permanent Joint Headquarters (UK). “Request for Information, Reference: 06-06-2011-110425-006.” J9 POLOPS 10A, June 9, 2011. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on Operations in Afghanistan.” November 2011. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence, J9 FOI Secretariat Permanent Joint Headquarters (UK). “Request for Information, Reference: FOI2016/08593.” October 11, 2016. [Link ]
Stabilisation Unit. “Working in a Military Headquarters (Exercises and Operations) – Deployee Guide.” December 12, 2016. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “Joint Doctrine Publication 3-46 Legal Support to Joint Operations.” 2018. [Link ]
UK Parliament. “Counter-Daesh Operations – Statement by State Secretary for Defence Gavin Williamson.” May 2, 2018. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence, J9 Secretariat Permanent Joint Headquarters (UK). “Request for Information. Reference: FOI 2019/07855 (189).” September 11, 2019. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “JSP 918, Joint Terminal Attack Controller Policy.” July 2020. [Link ]
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence. “UK Approach to Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” August 27, 2020. [Link ]
The Iraq Fatality Investigations. “Consolidated report into the death of Saeed Radhi Shabram Wawi Al-Bazooni.” September 2020. [Link ]
UK Parliament. “UK war crimes in Iraq: The ICC Prosecutor’s report.” January 15, 2021. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021.” July 2021. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “Service Police Legacy Investigations,” GOV.UK, October 19, 2021. [Link ]
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas — UNODA. “The Political Declaration.” 2022. [Link ]
Heappy, James. “Armed Conflict: Civilians,” TheyWorkForYou, January 27, 2022. [Link ]
Heappey, James. “Iraq and Syria: Military Intervention,” TheyWorkForYou, March 22, 2023. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “Iraq Fatality Investigations,” GOV.UK, November 1, 2022. [Link ]
Independent Inquiry Relating To Afghanistan. “Witness Statement: Colonel Kristian Paul Rotchell,” Unredacted, September 14, 2023. [Link ]
Ministry of Defence. “JSP 985, Human Security in Defence Volume 1: Incorporating Human Security in the way we Operate.” June 2024. [Link ]

Civil Society

Woods, Chris. “Europe’s Shame: Claims by Key Allies of No Civilian Harm in War Against ISIS Exposed.” Airwars, March 15, 2020. [Link ]
Bijl, Erin. “Civilian Harm Reporting Mechanisms,” PAX, May 9, 2020. [Link ]
Burke, Roseanne and Mark Lattimer. “Reparations for civilian harm from military operations: Towards a UK policy” Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, November 2021. [Link ]
McNerney, Michael J., Gabrielle Tarini, Karen M. Sudkamp, Larry Lewis, Michelle Grisé, and Pauline Moore. “U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies And Procedures: An Independent Assessment.” RAND, January 27, 2022. [Link ]
Stubbins Bates, Elizabeth. “Strengthening UK military investigations into civilian harm: Towards compliance, mitigation and accountability.” Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights, November 2024. [Link ]

Media

BBC News, “UK Government and Military Accused of War Crimes Cover-up,” BBC, November 17, 2019. [Link ]
Leigh Day. “Bereaved Families Welcome Statutory Inquiry Into Alleged Extrajudicial Killings in Afghanistan,” December 15, 2022. [Link ]
Graham-Harrison, Emma, and Joe Dyke. “Only Official Civilian Victim of UK’s Bombing Campaign Against IS Appears Not to Exist.” The Guardian, April 4, 2023. [Link ]
Graham-Harrison, Emma, and Joe Dyke. “Lives Torn Apart by British Airstrikes in Mosul Give Lie to UK’s ‘Perfect’ Precision War.” The Guardian, April 14, 2023. [Link ]
Graham-Harrison, Emma. “Ministry of Defence Lacks ‘Effective Oversight’ of Civilian Casualties, Tribunal Hears.” The Guardian, November 30, 2023. [Link ]
Gunter, Joel, Hannah O’Grady & Rory Tinman. “SAS Public Inquiry Obtains Deleted Computer Evidence,” BBC, July 2, 2024. [Link ]