© Peter Jan Rijpkema/Unsplash, 2020.

Country summary

Current Civilian Protection Monitor analysis covers policies and practices of this country up to February 1, 2025. The analysis below is a small sample of the CPM analysis; for the full version, go to the country report

The Netherlands has established a robust framework for transparency and accountability regarding civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR). The national policy reflects a commitment to civilian protection but remains ad hoc in its operational approach, making it vulnerable to shifts in personnel and political climate. While tracking mechanisms exist through coalition partnerships, a standardised Dutch system for tracking and analysing civilian harm is lacking, limiting institutional learning. Investigations into credible reports of civilian harm are conducted, but coordination between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) has at times been flawed, and public reporting lacks comprehensive details. Despite progressive transparency policies, reporting focuses mainly on direct casualties, omitting broader effects and investigative methodologies. Additionally, post-harm response mechanisms remain reactive, with amends offered on an ad hoc basis rather than through a standardised process. To enhance its approach, the Netherlands should establish policies on all relevant aspects of CHMR, implement standardised tracking and investigation mechanisms, ensure detailed public reporting, and formalise its approach to post-harm response.

Category description: The national policy or system of policies, strategies, and guidance adopted by the executive branch of government and its organs (including security institutions) that establishes clear authorities, responsibilities, and guidance for the prevention, mitigation, and response to civilian harm. A national policy framework, when combined with effective implementation of its provisions and formalised engagement with civil society actors can be helpful for communicating a government’s commitment to mitigate harm to civilians.

The policy that is in place is a strong approach to providing transparency on possible or confirmed civilian casualties resulting from Dutch arms deployment and outlines a commitment to civilian protection. When it comes to its operational approach to civilian harm tracking, investigation and response, the Netherlands relies on an ad hoc approach, leaving its valuable progress vulnerable to changes in personnel, political climate, and operational context.

Recommendations

  • Develop a comprehensive CHMR policy framework
  • Expand CHMR-related policy to apply to all military operations
  • Develop and standardise investigation and response protocols
  • Clarify roles and responsibilities at all levels

Indicator description: The government has adopted a comprehensive national policy framework on mitigating and responding to civilian harm resulting from its own military operations, including clear definitions of key terminology such as ‘civilian harm’.

Indicator description: The policy contains clear and actionable language and commitment to civilian harm mitigation and response.

Indicator description: Policy and implementation guidance is clear and includes defined roles and responsibilities.

Indicator description: Funding, personnel and time are given toward implementation of CHMR policies.

Category description: An internal (military or security force) process by which an armed actor gathers and analyses data about civilian harm incidents in order to better prevent, mitigate, and address harm in the future.

In previous operations, the Netherlands relied on coalition tracking systems (the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell in ISAF) and/or systems by its military partners (like the US in OIR). It is largely unclear what the process and quality of Dutch self-conducted assessments and investigations is, as well as how information on (possible) civilian harm cases are centrally archived. It also remains unclear how the Netherlands ensures previous harm incidents feed into institutional learning to prevent future harm. The creation of a civilian harm reporting portal is a meaningful step in the right direction, however this continues to be a passive rather than proactive means of data collection.

Recommendations

  • Establish a standardised civilian harm tracking mechanism
  • Proactively track and archive civilian harm incidents
  • Use tracking mechanisms for operational learning
  • Coordinate tracking and investigation systems

Indicator description: The government has or plans for the capabilities, resources, personnel, and systems needed to track civilian harm, i.e., to systematically collect and analyse information on harm.

Indicator description: The tracking mechanism is effectively designed to produce meaningful analysis and insights that are used by military leaders to change tactics or procedures. The express and stated purpose of the tracking mechanism in policy and practice is to prevent, mitigate, and address harm and promote institutional and operational learning.

Indicator description: Tracking mechanisms interact effectively with civilian harm investigations.

Indicator description: Tracking mechanisms have reliable access to accurate information and sufficiently detailed records about military operations (e.g., troop movements, airstrikes, incident reports). Incidents and analyses are properly archived and retrievable years later.

Category description: Formal inquiries (often in the form of administrative or criminal investigations) that can be used to elucidate facts, to understand the cause of harm, to identify relevant state and/or individual responsibilities, to facilitate the appropriate response and/or remedy, and even to exonerate.

In previous operations, the Netherlands relied on coalition tracking systems (the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell in ISAF) and/or systems by its military partners (like the US in OIR). It is largely unclear what the process and quality of Dutch self-conducted assessments and investigations is, as well as how information on (possible) civilian harm cases are centrally archived. It also remains unclear how the Netherlands ensures previous harm incidents feed into institutional learning to prevent future harm. The creation of a civilian harm reporting portal is a meaningful step in the right direction, however this continues to be a passive rather than proactive means of data collection.

Recommendations

  • Establish clear standards for assessments
  • Standardise and institutionalise investigation methodology
  • Further increase transparency in public reporting
  • Improve interaction between investigations and response mechanisms

Indicator description: Promptly investigates all credible reports of civilian harm, whether or not it is immediately clear that a violation of international law has occurred. Obtains relevant information from all internal, and, to the extent feasible, all external sources.

Indicator description: Investigating officers conduct site visits and/or conduct witness interviews or provide reasons why doing so is infeasible. If this is infeasible, there is clarity on how evidentiary gaps will be addressed.

Indicator description: Reports of investigations include a description of the process followed, the evidence consulted and included (including witness statements), information about its factual and legal findings, and recommendations for preventing a recurrence of civilian harm.

Indicator description: Investigations connect meaningfully to response mechanisms. Civilians who report incidents are informed of the possible response they can expect from the state. Acknowledgements of harm following the conclusion of an investigation address the next steps in terms of amends.

Indicator description: Incidents of a suspected criminal nature are referred to an independent, impartial investigative authority for investigating criminal violations.

Systems and procedures to ensure that the public and institutions of public oversight are made sufficiently aware of civilian harm, and to protect the right of victims to pursue remedy. Information may be limited or redacted due to privacy concerns for affected civilians, to safeguard other ongoing investigations or for national security reasons, but these reasons should be subject to review.

During operations, the MoD publishes weekly overviews of its engagements. The MoD has created policies with concrete steps for improved transparency, including periodic checks if transparency could be improved. In this area, the Netherlands is progressive compared to partners and allies. However, reports tend to focus only on direct casualties, omitting non-physical and reverberating effects on civilians, and lack details about investigative methodologies.

Recommendations

  • Ensure comprehensive civilian harm reporting
  • Publicly disclose processes and records on assessments and investigations
  • Prepare to implement existing transparency policies in high-intensity conflict

Indicator description: Makes public information, to include time and location, of operations including airstrikes, except in circumstances when doing so would place civilians or security personnel at risk.

Indicator description: Regularly issues and disseminates reports on civilian harm resulting from military operations that includes an estimate of casualties, the source of harm, the type of harm experienced, and the location of the incident(s) and any reasons for discrepancies with estimates or accounts from other sources such as NGOs or the media.

Indicator description: Releases information about mitigation tactics, investigative processes and records to the public whenever possible. Shares criteria used for the ‘credibility’ assessment and investigation of harm allegations.

Category description: Efforts to acknowledge and express condolence for harm, to include offers of monetary and non-monetary forms of post-harm assistance.

The MoD’s approach to offering amends for harm caused by operations is, as of yet, not standardised, although it has a history of providing various types of amends. While there is evidence of ad hoc ex-gratia payments and community compensation efforts, these have, at times, been delayed, insufficiently aligned with victims’ needs, and have not been part of a transparent framework. The lack of a formalised response procedure has resulted in an approach where compensation efforts are reactive rather than proactive.

Recommendations

  • Enable access to amends through standardised policy
  • Implement a comprehensive view of response
  • Emphasise moral responsibility in amends policy

Indicator description: The government implements a functional, timely, and adequately resourced process to receive and process requests and proactively provides monetary and non-monetary amends for harm caused by operations.

Indicator description: The government publicly acknowledges responsibility for harm.

Indicator description: Policies governing the offer and provision of condolences should be broadly defined, culturally appropriate and sensitive to local needs as defined by those affected.

Resources

Government

  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Civilian casualties,” n.d. [Link]
  • Nederlandse Grondwet. “Artikel 100: Handhaving of Bevordering Internationale Rechtsorde,” n.d. [Link]
  • Openbaar Ministerie. “Brief d.d. 20 november 2006 van het College van procureurs-generaal gericht aan de hoofdofficier van justitie te Arnhem, inhoudende de Handelwijze bij geweldsaanwending militairen,” Staatscourant, November 29, 2006. [Link]
  • Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. “Aanhangsel van de handelingen. Vragen van het lid Van Bommel (SP) aan de minister van Defensie over burgerslachtoffers in Uruzgan,” December 24, 2009. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Nota: Procedure minimaliseren/melden burgerslachtoffers,” December 19, 2014. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Transparantie burgerslachtoffers bij luchtaanvallen in de strijd tegen ISIS.,” November 4, 2019. [Link]
  • Tweede Kamer. “Gewijzigde motie van het lid Diks over onderzoeken van incidenten bij militaire inzet in coalitieverband (t.v.v. 35363-3)” December 19, 2019. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme,” November 25, 2019. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine 2019.”
Defensie.nl, [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Procedure informeren Tweede Kamer bij vermoeden van burgerslachtoffers tgv Nederlandse wapeninzet ihkv art. 100 van de Grondwet,” 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme ,” April 21, 2020. [Link]
  • Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. “Motie van de Leden Voordewind en Belhaj,” May 14, 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Kamerbrief Voortgang transparantiebeleid burgerslachtoffers,” June 30, 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Besluit op uw Wob-verzoek.” July 21, 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Vergoeding nabestaande wapeninzet Mosul.” September 8, 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” December 2, 2020. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “The Dutch Contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).” Defensie.nl, April 21, 2021. [Link]
  • Openbaar Ministerie. “Besluit Wob-verzoek inzake burgerdoden Afghanistan.” November 1, 2021. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Kamerbrief Stappenplan inzake burgerslachtoffers bij inzet in het kader van artikel 100 van de Grondwet,” April 7, 2022. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Antwoord op vragen van het lid van Dijk (SP) over de afhandeling schadevergoeding slachtoffers bombardement van Hawija,” April 7, 2022. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Antwoorden op vragen van de leden Sylvana Simons (BIJ1) en Jasper van Dijk (SP) aan de Minister van Defensie over door Nederland veroorzaakte doden, leed en schade in Hawija, Irak”, May 18, 2022. [Link]
  • Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas — UNODA. “The Political Declaration,” 2022. [Link]
  • Openbaar Ministerie. “Instructie Handelwijze Bij Geweldsaanwending Door Militairen,” March 1, 2023. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Weekoverzicht Defensieoperaties.” Defensie.nl, June 7, 2023. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Antwoorden op vragen van het lid Futselaar (SP) aan de Minister van Defensie over de ontwikkelingen met de schadevergoeding aan de bevolking van Hawija,” July 24, 2023. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Besluit op uw Woo-verzoek betreffende vaandelopschriften Afghanistan,” September 25, 2023. [Link]
  • Rijksoverheid. “Kamerbrief over Artikel 100-bijdrage aan maritieme veiligheid Rode Zee. March 8, 2024. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Antwoord op vragen van het lid Dobbe over het bericht dat er bij een Nederlandse wapeninzet in Afghanistan in 2007 mogelijk zes burgerslachtoffers zijn gevallen,” April 26, 2024. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Kamerbrief instelling meldpunt burgerslachtoffers,” June 13, 2024. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Database Nederlandse Luchtaanvallen Tijdens Operation Inherent Resolve,” Defensie.nl, October 1, 2024. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Burgerslachtoffers.” Defensie.nl, November 6, 2024. [Link]
  • Ministerie van Defensie. “Reporting Civilian Harm.” Defensie.nl, December 31, 2024. [Link]
  • Commissie van Onderzoek Wapeninzet Hawija, January 2025. [Link]

Civil Society

  • Bijl, Erin. “Civilian Harm Reporting Mechanisms,” PAX, May 9, 2020. [Link]
  • Burke, Roseanne and Mark Lattimer. “Reparations for civilian harm from military operations: Towards a UK policy” Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, November 2021. [Link]
  • McNerney, Michael J., Gabrielle Tarini, Karen M. Sudkamp, Larry Lewis, Michelle Grisé, and Pauline Moore. “U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies And Procedures: An Independent Assessment.” RAND, January 27, 2022. [Link]
  • Azeem, Saba, Lauren Gould, Erin Bijl and Jolle Demmers “After the Strike,” PAX, IRW, Al Ghad, April 8, 2022. [Link]
  • Put, S. van de “Vrijwillige compensatie in militaire operaties,” Miliair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, April 2, 2024. [Link]
  • Airwars, CIVIC, PAX, Utrecht University. “Looking Back to Look Forward: CHM Recommendations to the MoD.” PAX, May 23, 2024. [Link]

Media

  • Berkhout, Karel. “Een mensenleven is 2.500 tot 4.200 dollar waard. NRC, October 18, 2019. [Link]
  • Meindertsma, Ben and Lex Runderkamp. “In Hawija Is Niemand De Nederlandse Bomaanval Vergeten.” NOS, October 18, 2019. [Link]
  • Meindertsma, Ben “Defensie Had in 2014 Al Richtlijn Voor Compensatie Burgerslachtoffers Irak.” NOS, February 10, 2020. [Link]
  • Meindertsma, Ben. “OM-onderzoek Naar Burgerdoden Hawija Was Laat En Beperkt.” NOS, February 18, 2020. [Link]
  • Schipper, Jannie, and Kees Versteegh. “Nederlandse Bom Doodde 70 Mensen.” NRC, June 4, 2020. [Link]
  • Boffey, Daniel. “Mosul Civilian First to Be Compensated for Mistaken Coalition Bombing.” The Guardian, August 31, 2021. [Link]
  • Versteegh, Kees, and Melvyn Ingleby. “Dutch Government Releases Crucial Data on Air Strikes Against ISIS Following New Evidence of Civilian Casualties.” NRC, March 31, 2023. [Link]
  • Ingleby, Melvyn, and Kees Versteegh. “Het Leed in Hawija Erkennen En Verzachten Is Mislukt.” NRC, July 3, 2023. [Link]
  • Foltyn, Simona. “UN Staff on £1.5bn Iraq Aid Project ‘Demanding Bribes.’” The Guardian, January 23, 2024. [Link]